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A B S T R A C T
Historically, Industrial Automation and Control Systems (IACS) were largely isolated from conventional digital
networks such as enterprise ICT environments. Where connectivity was required, a zoned architecture was
adopted, with ﬁrewalls and/or demilitarized zones used to protect the core control system components. The
adoption and deployment of ‘Internet of Things’ (IoT) technologies is leading to architectural changes to IACS,
including greater connectivity to industrial systems. This paper reviews what is meant by Industrial IoT (IIoT)
and relationships to concepts such as cyber-physical systems and Industry 4.0. The paper develops a deﬁnition of
IIoT and analyses related partial IoT taxonomies. It develops an analysis framework for IIoT that can be used to
enumerate and characterise IIoT devices when studying system architectures and analysing security threats and
vulnerabilities. The paper concludes by identifying some gaps in the literature.
1. Introduction
The concept of Industrial Automation and Control Systems (IACS) is
well established. These systems, often referred to as Operational
Technology (OT), are employed in diverse industries including manu-
facturing, transportation and utilities, and are sometimes referred to as
cyber-physical systems (CPS). Since the term Internet of Things (IoT)
[1] was ﬁrst used in 1999, it has been applied to connected devices in
consumer, domestic, business and industrial settings [2]. Although
there is a signiﬁcant amount of literature attempting to deﬁne IoT, its
uses, and its typical components, it is rarely made obvious how any of
this applies in the industrial setting.
Because current deﬁnitions of IoT invariably imply a similar ap-
proach to the high-level architecture of a system, the ubiquitous use of
the term IoT to refer to the use of digital technologies in industry is
unhelpful as it hinders the analysis of alternative system architectures,
including the location and nature of the data or information processing,
and associated performance and security issues. The aims of this paper
are to improve on existing deﬁnitions of Industrial IoT (IIoT) and to
propose a framework for IIoT components as a basis for analysing the
use and deployment of IoT technologies in industrial settings. In un-
dertaking this research our aim was to establish a framework that al-
lows us to analyse the nature of IIoT devices and their uses, which is to
be used as part of a vulnerability and threat analysis process for these
devices. By being able to characterise the devices in a systematic
manner, we anticipate being able to analyse cross-cutting threats and
vulnerabilities and identify patterns that may be obscured when
focusing on the technology employed or sector speciﬁc issues.
This paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides some further
background to CPS, IACS, and the Industrial Internet, setting it against
the background of Industry 4.0. Section 3 provides our analysis and
deﬁnition of IIoT, which builds on existing explanations that are pre-
sented. Section 4 presents our framework. Finally, Section 5 identiﬁes
gaps in the current literature that need to be addressed in future work
2. Background
Whilst researching IIoT we have reviewed a wide range of academic
literature and found that when combining the search terms:
(“Industrial Machines” OR “Industrial Systems”) AND “Internet” OR
(“Industrial Internet”) AND “Machines”
The following terms were amongst those most regularly found:
Cyber Physical Systems (CPS), Industrial Control Systems (ICS),
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA), and Industrial
Internet.
Although not an exhaustive list, it does represent the most com-
monly used terms in both academic and relevant non-academic litera-
ture, for white papers and corporate blogs. In the rest of this section we
deﬁne Industry 4.0 and review the above terms before moving on to
develop our deﬁnition of IIoT and the taxonomy.
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2.1. Industry 4.0
The ﬁrst three industrial revolutions are characterised as being
driven by mechanical production relying on water and steam power,
use of mass labour and electrical energy, and the use of electronic,
automated production respectively [3]. Whilst the supposed fourth in-
dustrial revolution (‘Industry 4.0’) was ﬁrst proposed in 2011 in the
context of the goal of developing the German economy [4]. This re-
volution is characterised by its reliance on the use of CPS capable of
communication with one another and of making autonomous, de-cen-
tralised decisions, with the aim of increasing industrial eﬃciency,
productivity, safety, and transparency.
There is a considerable overlap between the concept of Industry 4.0
developed in Germany and the Industrial Internet concept (see 2.6),
which originated in the United States. The deﬁnition of the latter now
encompasses change for both business and individuals:
“…the industrial internet is an internet of things, machines, com-
puters and people enabling intelligent industrial operations using
advanced data analytics for transformational business outcomes,
and it is redeﬁning the landscape for business and individuals alike”
[5].
A deﬁnition of ‘Industrie 4.0′ a term which, in its English cognate,
the authors treat as synonymous with IIoT, is:
“…we deﬁne Industrie 4.0 as follows: Industrie 4.0 is a collective
term for technologies and concepts of value chain organisation.
Within the modular structured Smart Factories of Industrie 4.0, CPS
monitor physical processes, create a virtual copy of the physical
world and make decentralized decisions. Over the IoT, CPS com-
municate and cooperate with each other and humans in real time.
Via the IoS [Internet of Services], both internal and cross- organi-
zational services are oﬀered and utilised by participants of the value
chain.” [6]
2.2. Cyber-physical systems (CPS)
Whilst there are a number of deﬁnitions of CPS [7–11], this paper
uses: “A system comprising a set of interacting physical and digital
components, which may be centralised or distributed, that provides a
combination of sensing, control, computation and networking func-
tions, to inﬂuence outcomes in the real world through physical pro-
cesses.” [12]
What sets CPS apart from more conventional information and
communications systems (IT or ICT) is the real-time character of their
interactions with the physical world. Whilst both CPS and ICT systems
process data and/or information, the focus of CPS is on the control of
physical processes. CPS use sensors to receive information about, in-
cluding measurements of, physical parameters, and actuators to engage
in control over physical processes. CPS often involve a large degree of
autonomy. For example, CPS often have the capacity to determine
whether to change the state of an actuator or to draw a human op-
erator’s attention to some feature of the environment being sensed.
2.3. Industrial automation & control systems (IACS)
IACS or ICS is a collective term typically used to describe diﬀerent
types of control systems and associated instrumentation, which include
the devices, systems, networks, and controls used to operate and/or
automate industrial processes. Descriptions of ICS from authoritative
American and European organisations are respectively:
• “Initially, ICS had little resemblance to traditional information
technology (IT) systems in that ICS were isolated systems running
proprietary control protocols using specialized hardware and soft-
ware. Many ICS components were in physically secured areas and
the components were not connected to IT networks or systems.
Widely available, low-cost Internet Protocol (IP) devices are now
replacing proprietary solutions” [13]; and
• “Today ICS products are mostly based on standard embedded sys-
tems platforms, applied in various devices, such as routers or cable
modems, and they often use commercial oﬀ-the shelf software” and
“command and control networks and systems designed to support
industrial processes. The largest subgroup of ICS is SCADA” [14].
2.4. Supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA)
SCADA has been described as:
• A system that allows an operator, in a location central to a widely
distributed process, such as an oil or gas ﬁeld, pipeline system, or
hydroelectric generating complex, to make set point changes on
distant process controllers, to open or close valves or switches, to
monitor alarms, and to gather measurement information [15];
• Similar to a Distributed Control System with the exception of sub-
control systems being geographically dispersed over large areas and
accessed using Remote Terminal Servers [16]. Where a Distributed
Control System (DCS) is a supervisory control system typically
controls and monitors set points to sub-controllers distributed geo-
graphically throughout a factory [17]; and
• SCADA applications are made up of two elements: the process/
system/machinery you want to monitor and control, which can take
the form of a power plant, a water system, a network or a system of
traﬃc lights; and a network of intelligent devices that interface with
the ﬁrst system through sensors and control outputs. This network,
which is the platform system, provides the capability to measure and
control speciﬁc elements of the ﬁrst system [18].
The nature of SCADA has led to conﬂicting views as to whether it
forms part of the IIoT ecosystem. For example, discussion of SCADA
system forensic analysis within IIoT [19] contrasts with a view that
SCADA is simply the predecessor to IIoT especially as SCADA systems
have evolved to connect to the internet but do not have the analytics
and level of connectivity that is found in IIoT [20].
2.5. Industrial internet
The concept of an Industrial Internet was ﬁrst articulated by General
Electric (GE) [21], and described as:
“The deﬁnition of the Industrial Internet includes two key compo-
nents: The connection of industrial machine sensors and actuators to
local processing and to the Internet; The onward connection to other
important industrial networks that can independently generate
value. The main diﬀerence between the consumer/social Internets
and the Industrial Internet is in how and how much value is created.
For consumer/social Internets, the majority of value is created from
advertisements” [22].
This description clearly separates the Internet and the Industrial
Internet, although in both cases the function of the Internet is to pro-
vide the wide area networking. More recently the Industrial Internet
has been deﬁned as:
“… a source of both operational eﬃciency and innovation that is the
outcome of a compelling recipe of technology developments [sic].
The resulting sum of those parts gives you the Industrial
Internet—the tight integration of the physical and digital worlds.
The Industrial Internet enables companies to use sensors, software,
machine-to-machine learning and other technologies to gather and
analyse data from physical objects or other large data streams—and
then use those analyses to manage operations and in some cases to
oﬀer new, value-added services” [23].
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From this deﬁnition, it is apparent that the authors consider a key
component of the Industrial Internet to be the ability to analyse data,
which is corroborated by a statement later in their report, in which it is
stated that “⋯Big Data analytics is the foundation of the Industrial
Internet…”. This desire to collect and analyses data is a feature in
common with Industry 4.0.
3. Industrial internet of things (IIoT)
Whilst there are numerous IoT deﬁnitions, those of relevance to
industrial application make explicit the kinds of smart components that
get embedded into ordinary objects so that those objects can count as
IoT devices, and form constituents of cyber-physical systems (CPS).
Three relevant deﬁnitions are:
• A deﬁnition for the IoT would be a “group of infrastructures, in-
terconnecting connected objects and allowing their management,
data mining and the access to data they generate” where connected
objects are “sensor(s) and/or actuator(s) carrying out a speciﬁc
function that are able to communicate with other equipment” [24];
• “The terms ‘Internet of Things’ and “IoT” refer broadly to the ex-
tension of network connectivity and computing capability to objects,
devices, sensors, and items not ordinarily considered to be compu-
ters. These “smart objects” require minimal human intervention to
generate, exchange, and consume data; they often feature con-
nectivity to remote data collection, analysis, and management cap-
abilities” [25]; and
• “The IoT represents a scenario in which every object or ‘thing’ is
embedded with a sensor and is capable of automatically commu-
nicating its state with other objects and automated systems within
the environment. Each object represents a node in a virtual network,
continuously transmitting a large volume of data about itself and its
surroundings…” [26].
On the basis of these, an initial deﬁnition of IIoT might be: the use of
certain IoT technologies – certain kinds of smart objects within cyber-
physical systems – in an industrial setting, for the promotion of goals
distinctive to industry. Similar simple deﬁnitions were found in our
literature search, for example:
• “The Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) is the use of Internet of
Things (IoT) technologies in manufacturing” [27]; and
• “Industrial Internet: A short-hand for the industrial applications of
IoT, also known as the Industrial Internet of Things, or IIoT” [28].
Such a simple conception is not suﬃcient for our purposes in this
paper, however. We need something substantive and a precise con-
ception to inform our proposed IIoT framework. The simple conception
does provide a template for a deﬁnition of IIoT, for it correctly attempts
to deﬁne IIoT by appeal to two essential features: (a) the kinds of
technologies that are used in an IIoT setting and (b) the distinctive aims
and purposes to which those technologies are put. We need a deﬁnition
which has that structure, but which gives us a more substantial ex-
pansion of (a) and (b).
An advantage of the simple conception is that because it makes it
clear that the relevant technologies are used for purposes distinctive to
industry, it satisﬁes the basic criterion of enabling us to distinguish IoT
devices from IIoT devices. For example, devices such as smart bike locks
and smart kettles are not useful from the point of view of industry per se,
the simple conception correctly classiﬁes those items as non-IIoT de-
vices. Despite this advantage, the deﬁnition remains uninformative
nevertheless.
A further pitfall to avoid when attempting to arrive at a deﬁnition of
IIoT is deﬁning IIoT in terms of some other notion, which is not ob-
viously diﬀerent from the notion of IIoT itself, which would render the
deﬁnition uninformatively circular. That sort of problem is exempliﬁed
in the industry-driven literature by, for example:
“The IIoT vision of the world is one where smart connected assets
(the things) operate as part of a larger system or systems of systems
that make up the smart manufacturing enterprise” [29].
Since ‘smart manufacturing enterprise’ is essentially an industrial
enterprise that exempliﬁes the features of IIoT, this deﬁnition is also
uninformatively circular.
In seeking to formulate an improved conception of IIoT we searched
the contemporary academic and industry-driven literature for more
informative deﬁnitions than those already cited. We found a few that
improved on the simplistic and circular deﬁnitions already presented.
A deﬁnition that improves incrementally over the simple deﬁnition
is:
“Industrial Internet or Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) is built for
bigger ‘things’ than smartphones and wireless devices. It aims at
connecting industrial assets, like engines, power grids and sensor to
cloud over a network” [30].
This deﬁnition goes beyond the simple conception by making it
explicit that it is industrial assets which are counted as connected in an
IIoT setting, and it tells us a little about the nature of that connection:
that the relevant assets are connected to a cloud, over a network.
A second deﬁnition which adds some further details is:
“The Industrial Internet of Things (Industrial IoT) is made up of a
multitude of devices connected by communications software. The
resulting systems, and even the individual devices that comprise it,
can monitor, collect, exchange, analyse, and instantly act on in-
formation to intelligently change their behaviour or their environ-
ment – all without human intervention” [31]
The central advantage of this still admittedly vague deﬁnition is that
it makes it clear what the function of IIoT devices is: to monitor, collect,
exchange, and analyse information so as to enable them to change their
own behaviour, or else instruct other devices to do so, without human
intervention.
A number of researchers writing in German, oﬀer a cluster of deﬁ-
nitions of IIoT that share a focus on the kinds of technologies which are
put into operation in IIoT settings, and the ways they are put to use in
those settings. It is suggested that a central element of IIoT is its reliance
[32], in an industrial setting, on objects, systems and machinery which
has been upgraded to the status of a CPS, so that products and services
can be guided through the supply and value chains in an autonomous
manner. Another perspective [33] is that IIoT relies not just on CPS, but
also on embedded systems, cloud computing, edge computing, the
generic technologies associated with the smart factory, and associated
software. A further insight [34] relates to the aims and purposes of IIoT
technologies, suggesting that they should not merely function to enable
autonomous production, but enable real-time information to users,
consumers and other processes. The deﬁnition of Industrie 4.0 in Sec-
tion 2.1 sheds light on the kinds of technological processes utilised as
part of IIoT, and how those processes are applied in promoting the
values of the relevant industries whilst also making it explicit how IIoT
technologies are connected to other features of the industrial techno-
logical landscape, such as Smart Factories and the Internet of Services
(i.e. a “thing” as a service, e.g. Power as a Service or Mobility as a
Service).
We are now able to provide our own working deﬁnition of IIoT. It
has the same structure as the simple conception we started out with:
IIoT is deﬁned by appeal to the kinds of technologies which compose it,
as well as by appeal to the distinctive uses to which those technologies
are put, but builds in more details that the simple conception:
Industrial Internet of Things: A system comprising networked smart
objects, cyber-physical assets, associated generic information tech-
nologies and optional cloud or edge computing platforms, which
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enable real-time, intelligent, and autonomous access, collection,
analysis, communications, and exchange of process, product and/or
service information, within the industrial environment, so as to
optimise overall production value. This value may include; im-
proving product or service delivery, boosting productivity, reducing
labour costs, reducing energy consumption, and reducing the build-
to-order cycle.
4. IIoT: an analysis framework
Before developing our analysis framework, we reviewed existing
published material on industry-focused IoT taxonomies and a range of
industry material, in particular manufacturers’ white papers, case stu-
dies and technical articles describing speciﬁc products or implementa-
tions. We identiﬁed seven published IoT taxonomies in the academic
literature, which address the IoT as a whole and are not speciﬁcally
focused on IIoT.
4.1. Review of existing IoT taxonomies
In undertaking this research our aim was to establish a framework
that allows us to analyse the nature of IIoT devices and their uses,
which is to be used as part of a vulnerability and threat analysis process
for these devices. None of the taxonomies outlined above provide suf-
ﬁcient coverage of the characteristics of devices to support our objec-
tives. The speciﬁc limitations of the taxonomies can be summarised as
follows:
(a) the device-centric taxonomy [35] – this approach provides useful
characteristics at device level (e.g. energy, communication, func-
tional attributes, local interface, hardware and software resources),
but does provide information about the role of the device, its
physical or architectural locations, and the sector in which it is
being used;
(b) the IoT stack-centric taxonomy [36] – whilst some of the char-
acteristics (e.g. service, data, interaction and thing) addressed in
this approach may be of value the stack does not relate to the
conventional IACS hierarchy that is described in the Purdue Model
[37]. We considered the concept of service in this taxonomy to be
ﬂawed as a particular device may contribute to fulﬁlment of mul-
tiple business objectives;
(c) the IoT sensor taxonomy [38] – the characteristics (e.g. motion,
position, environment, mass measurement and biosensor) used by
this approach are useful for devices that have a sensing capability,
but this is only a subset of the range of IIoT devices;
(d) the IoT-based smart environment taxonomy [39] – this is of limited
utility from a security perspective as its emphasis is on classiﬁcation
of the networking elements (e.g. communication enablers, network
type, technologies, local area wireless standards, objectives and
characteristics), the technology elements are very broad and the
objectives (e.g. cost reduction) are diﬃcult to apportion at device
rather than system level;
(e) the IoT architecture taxonomy [40] – this combines a mixture of
business architecture and technical characteristics (e.g. applica-
tions, enabling technologies, business objectives, architectural re-
quirements, IoT platforms architecture types and network topolo-
gies), but given the use of only six classiﬁcation elements is of
limited value for classifying devices;
(f) the Industrial Internet of Things taxonomy [41] – the approach is
immature in terms of the classiﬁcation criteria (e.g. reliability, real-
time, data item scale, module scale, runtime integration, distribu-
tion focus and collection focus) with only single examples given for
each criterion, and the six criteria would not provide us with suf-
ﬁcient granularity to compare and contrast the security proﬁle of
individual devices;
(g) the domain or sector-based IoT taxonomies [42] – this is helpful in
addressing the business use to which a device is being put, however
this taxonomy does not address the technical or architectural as-
pects of device design and deployment as it identiﬁes the type of
device but not its characteristics.
Whilst none of the existing taxonomies meet our needs, as they are
either too high level or incomplete from a device characterisation
perspective, we can draw upon them and our own investigation of
current IIoT proposed and actual solutions to develop an analytical
framework for IIoT devices. We also considered the theoretical foun-
dations of cyber manufacturing [43] and the work published by the
CyPhERS project, for example [44]. However, neither of these pub-
lications provide the framework we were seeking as a basis for ana-
lysing devices.
Given the limitations in the published literature we have developed
a framework for characterising IIoT devices. We have not sought to call
it a taxonomy as it does not have a branching structure based on a
single root, nor is it an ontology, given inconsistent use of many of the
technology terms and the propensity for product marketers to create
new jargon to diﬀerentiate their products.
Our approach, which is described in more detail below is to char-
acterise devices based on six categories, with each category having a
number of sub-categories:
• Industry sector;
• Device location;
• Connectivity;
• Device characteristics;
• Device technology;
• User type.
Each of the remaining sub-sections sets out the rational for in-
cluding the category within our framework, providing a diagram that
illustrates its breakdown and a rational for the proposed structure. In
setting out our framework we provide examples of each category using
a programmable logic controller (PLC) as the device.
4.2. Industry sector
The industry sectors illustrated in Fig. 1 are relevant to the severity
and nature of threats to an organisation and the IIoT devices deployed
in the organisation’s operational systems [45]. All of the sectors make
use of IACS to varying degrees, and there is likely to be increased use of
IIoT based on industry trends reported by market research companies as
referred to in Section 4.1. With the exception of retail, the sub-cate-
gories listed above are generally recognised as critical infrastructure of
developed economies. Retail has been included to reﬂect the criticality
of supply of essential supplies to citizens and to reﬂect the increasing
technical complexity of many retail outlets, for example the building
automation, management and security systems deployed in their pre-
mises. The breakdown of the Manufacturing sector is adapted from the
report on digital manufacturing commissioned by the UK government
[46].
Using this category the PLC might be described as:
4.3. Location
In Fig. 2, we propose a taxonomy that considers the location of the
IIoT device from a number of perspectives, which are relevant in terms
of the device’s exposure to risks from both cyber and physical security
perspectives.
Four sub-categories are proposed:
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(a) Ecosystem – There are a number of models oﬀered for IoT ecosys-
tems [47–50], but these are generic and not speciﬁcally related to
IIoT implementations. An ecosystem model that does directly re-
lated to industrial applications [51] is illustrated in Fig. 3. The
proposed classiﬁcation scheme is adapted from this model but ex-
tended to include the wider enterprise IT to accommodate the
convergence of information and operation technologies, and ad-
jacencies. In the Thing class we have included a sub-class “Monitor’
to accommodate devices that provide a wider functionality than
measurements, e.g. a CTV camera.
(b) Purdue Model – the Purdue Model for Control Hierarchy [52,53] is
a well-recognised model in the manufacturing industry that seg-
ments devices and equipment into hierarchical functions. This
model has been used by international standards organisations
[54,55] to specify a zone and conduit model for IACS security and is
also used in a variety of security [56] and safety [57] guidance
material. The model, illustrated in Fig. 4, uses the concept of zones
in order to subdivide Enterprise and ICS networks into modules that
function in a similar way.
(c) Physical – this element seeks to characterise the environment that
the device is installed, which therefore allows the level of physical
security vulnerability to be considered. For example, devices that
are located externally are likely to be much more susceptible to
physical damage, theft or being interfered with, as well as being
exposed to the elements and a variety of natural hazards.
(d) Mobility – this element provides an indication of whether the de-
vice is only used in a ﬁxed location or may be moved around, on its
own or as part of a system. Mobile devices are likely to require a
wireless communications mechanism to convey data and permit
conﬁguration and/or control, thus exposing the device to the threat
of interference or jamming. In addition, there may be a need to
track or geolocate the device so as to correctly interpret the data it
provides.
Fig. 1. Industry Sector category.
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Using this category the PLC might be described as:
4.4. Connectivity
The proposed connectivity characteristics are illustrated in Fig. 5,
the aim of using these is to identify the essential features of the net-
working or communications connectivity between the device and the
IIoT system within which it operates.
The ﬁve proposed sub-categories are explained as follows:
(a) Mechanism – the focus of this sub-category is on the physical me-
chanism used to convey any communications to or from the device.
Two classes that may appear unusual are no connectivity and
physical connectivity. The former relates to devices that may be
recording changes to the environment, where measurement data is
stored in the device for later recovery on its retrieval and decom-
missioning, for example an IoT-based dosimeter. The latter relates
to devices in hazardous or extreme environments, for example an
IoT device employing ultrasonic communications rather than RF
signals in an inﬂammable or explosive environment.
(b) Nature – whether the communications is in real-time or near real-
time, implying continuous connectivity is required, or whether data
can be stored and forwarded either on a schedule or on request.
(c) Initiation – this relates to how communication is initiated;
(d) Protocols – this relates to the protocols used to establish and
manage the link and to convey information, examples of the three
classes are: Infrastructure (IPv4, IPv6, 6LoWPAN, UDP); Discovery
(mDNS, HyperCat, UPnP); and Data protocols (MQTT, XMPP, LLAP,
REST, SOAP).
(e) Link security – this focuses on the level of security and trust in-
volved in establishing and operating the connectivity.
Using this category, the PLC may be described as:
Fig. 2. Location category.
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4.5. Device characteristics
The focus of the proposed device characteristics, illustrated in
Fig. 6, is on functionality of the device, speciﬁcally how important it is
to the system it is part of, the function the device provides, and how it is
managed.
The proposed sub-categories are justiﬁed as follows:
(a) Criticality – this focuses on the criticality of the device in terms of
impact on the overall operational process and how easy it is to
repair or replace a faulty or malfunctioning device. The greater the
impact and the more diﬃcult it is to replace or repair, the greater
the security risks arising from any attempts to attack or interfere
with the device. Safety critical devices clearly need to be en-
gineered and designed to higher standards than those where the is
little impact and they are easy to replace.
(b) Function – this class is used to describe the principal function(s) of
the device. When considering a device with analytic functions, the
nature of the algorithm(s) used is relevant.
(c) Relationships – this class is intended to allow understanding of how
the device relates to other devices and the processes, systems or
environment within which it operates. For example, a temperature
sensor in a room may be linked to an aggregating or control device,
as its role is to measure the temperature in the space that it is
installed in, it is part of an environmental conditioning process and
it will be aﬀected if a door or window is opened or left open in the
space within which it is located.
(d) Management interface – relates to how the device is conﬁgured,
turned on/oﬀ or otherwise controlled.
Using this category, the PLC may be described as:
4.6. Technology
The proposed technology characteristics of the IIoT device are il-
lustrated in Fig. 7. These focus on technical features that may constrain
or inﬂuence device design or the ability to address vulnerabilities once
the device has been deployed.
The power source, energy use and hardware characteristics are re-
levant as they can constrain the processing capacity of the device,
which in turn aﬀects the design of security mechanisms used to protect
the connectivity and may limit the ability to patch or update the device
once deployed. The operating system, software type and updatability
are relevant given the launch of IoT botnets, for example the Mirai
botnet [58,59], as they represent a potential vulnerability and if not
updateable may limit the ability to respond to botnet malware. The
identity of the device manufacturer and a unique identiﬁer are
Fig. 3. A 4-Stage IoT solutions architecture© HPE.
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important for conﬁguration management purposes.
Given the nature of IIoT devices and their extensive use of software
the concept of trustworthiness is an important technical characteristic.
This sub-category references the publicly accessible speciﬁcation (PAS
754) [60], which provides a framework designed to cover all aspects of
the system and software lifecycle, as deﬁned by ISO/IEC 15288 [61]. Of
particular relevance is the trustworthiness level matrix [62], which
considers the degree of trustworthiness required from a component,
composed sub-system or system is dependent on software and the po-
tential impact. Thus, for a component where software provides the sole
source of trustworthiness if the impact is deemed signiﬁcant or critical a
high level of trustworthiness should be required and demonstrated.
Using this category, by way of example, an Arduino-based PLC [63]
can be described as:
4.7. User
The proposed user characteristics, as illustrated in Fig. 8, are in-
tended to allow identiﬁcation of who or what the device is interacting
with. The proposed user types are either a human or machine, for ex-
ample where the device is sensing and providing machine-to-machine
communication for system control or monitoring purposes. With re-
gards to the user interface, a device may be:
(a) headless, i.e. there is no indication of device status, measurements
or operation;
(b) direct, either passive (e.g. a room thermostat displaying tempera-
ture but not allowing user control) or active (e.g. a device with an
interactive touch-sensitive display that allows interrogation of the
device status and may permit some control of it);
(c) indirect, i.e. the device can be interrogated via another device in
the IIoT system.
Using this category, the PLC may be described as:
5. Discussion, gaps and recommendations for future research
The approach used to develop our analysis framework is consistent
with that used by MITRE in the development of their MAEC [64]
method used for malware attribute enumeration and characterisation.
As with the development of MAEC, it is inappropriate to employ a
taxonomy based on a single top-down tree structure as speciﬁc in-
stances or applications of an IIoT device may result in its classiﬁcation
under multiple branches of the tree. The value of our proposed multi-
dimensional approach is that it allows classiﬁcation of an IIoT device
based on pre-deﬁnes attributes that can be used in systematic studies.
Depending on the nature of a study, the researcher can decide which
categories and classes to employ, thus allowing the focus to be nar-
rowed or broadened to suit the speciﬁc research question. For example,
if the focus of a study was on software vulnerabilities, the researcher
could choose to ignore industry sector and user type, and focus on the
following categories:
• device location and connectivity – to allow assessment of the degree
of exposure of the device to potential attacks;
• device characteristics and technology – enabling assessment of the
nature and criticality of the software, ease of software updates and
systematic risks associated with the processing platform and oper-
ating system in use.
The framework set out in this paper provides a mechanism for
systematic collection of information about IIoT devices. It was devel-
oped as part of a research initiative investigating IIoT security issues.
The data collection and analysis is ongoing, however the development
of this framework potentially allows comparison of threats and vul-
nerabilities between diﬀerent sectors ad application in much the same
way as the MAEC approach discussed above.
Having presented our analysis framework, during our research
several observations were made which the authors believe to constitute
gaps that could be addressed by further research. These recommenda-
tions are not presented in any order of importance; we note that each is
critical to ensuring future understanding, resiliency and security within
IIoT ecosystem, and therefore make no judgement as to their relative
importance.
Fig. 4. Purdue Reference Model.
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5.1. Mapping the IIoT ecosystem and threat landscape
There are a number of publications available that explore and
analyse issues of security and privacy relating to IoT in general, there is
little work speciﬁcally focusing on the IIoT ecosystem. We propose
using our taxonomy, to explore and better understand the IIoT eco-
system and associated threat landscape, so as to identify vulnerabilities
and potential security and/or privacy concerns.
5.2. Limited research on OT and ICT convergence
Whilst there is some work, primarily analyst [65] or vendor [66],
driven, which directly states or implies that IIoT is the result of con-
vergence between Operational Technology (OT) and traditional in-
formation and communication technologies (ICT). For example, it is
suggested [67] that:
‘… merging IT and OT isn’t an easy task. Merging these two areas
requires well-deﬁned, scalable standards that span from assets to
data centers and vice-versa. It’s also crucial that these standards are
secure, otherwise critical and expensive operational assets can be
vulnerable. All these concerns can be tackled by following the
concept of ‘Enterprise Architecture’.’
The above approach is indicative of a lack of understanding of the
diﬀerences between conventional enterprise ICT systems and the cyber-
physical systems that are found in industrial applications. In contrast, a
better-informed assessment [68] of the security challenges faced in
securing IoT devices recognised some of the constraints:
“These current security mechanisms, based on ‘traditional public-
key infrastructures will almost certainly not scale to accommodate
the IoT’s amalgam of contexts and devices.’
In this assessment, the authors were taking into account the lim-
itations of IIoT devices, for example, sensors, actuators and RFID tags,
where there are processing, power and economic constraints limiting
the use of strong encryption.
In addition to these technical issues, there is also the mismatch
between the relative short lifespan of many ICT devices and the relative
longevity of IACS devices, which are often expected to have a lifespan
an order of magnitude longer than their ICT counterparts. We propose
to use our analysis framework as a basis for exploring the IT/OT con-
vergence issues.
5.3. Providing solutions to brownﬁeld issues
Legacy systems, i.e. a brownﬁeld site, inject complexity into a wide
range of cases. A compelling argument has been made [69] regarding
the need for developers to considering the issue of brownﬁeld IIoT:
…how important in industrial IoT (IIoT), such as smart buildings,
bridges, roads, railways and all infrastructure that have been around
for decades and will continue to be around for decades more.
Fig. 5. Connectivity category.
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Further research is required to consider the implications of instal-
ling IIoT devices in an operational architecture, where security has been
implemented using the zones and conduits inherent in the Purdue
Model. As with the topics of security and scalability of IIoT, circular
conversations are occurring, solutions are required that address both
greenﬁeld and brownﬁeld installations, and again the relative longevity
of IACS device needs to be taken into account.
5.4. Limited research on safety and security of IIoT devices
Safety and security should be paramount in industrial systems to
prevent harm and minimise threat to personnel, assets and the en-
vironment. There is increasing industry recognition that safety and
security are related [70], for example that connectivity brings both
opportunity and risk and that poor security threatens safety. This is also
recognised in international functional safety standards [71,72]. With
traditional IACS systems, the application of the security principles in
based on international standards [73], which advocate use of security
models aimed at delivering defence in depth, particularly with re-
ference to connections between diﬀerent layers in the Purdue Model
and segregation of processes.
The adoption of IIoT undermines these established practices by
creating new connectivity from systems to enterprise or cloud-based
systems, thus increasing the potential for safety and security related
breaches. There is a current lack of consistent approaches to the com-
bined assessment of safety and security risks inherent in deployment of
IIoT solutions. A combined framework has been proposed [74], but
further work is required to codify its use and test its applicability in
industrial plants.
6. Conclusion
In conclusion, having laid out the background including an over-
view of related terms in section two, we provided a survey of existing
deﬁnitions of IIoT in section three and developed our own deﬁnition
which we hope improves on those. In section four we then provided an
analysis framework for IIoT devices which provides a practical classi-
ﬁcation schema for those with an interest in security-related issues
surrounding IIoT. The use of the schema has been illustrated by ex-
amples at the end of each of the sections describing the six categories.
Finally, in section ﬁve, some gaps in the IIoT related literature were
identiﬁed, which we propose should be addressed as part of our con-
tinuing research.
Fig. 6. Device category.
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